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A Misunderstanding of Moral Distress 
 
Campbell, Ulrich and Grady (2016) should be commended for attempting to contribute to the 
discussion of what many believe is currently a messy concept.  They propose that a broader 
definition of moral distress is desirable and offer up a new one.  Sadly, despite their 
acknowledgment of caution from previous authors, their proposed definition is so broad that it is 
diagnostically and analytically meaningless.  The authors’ vague definition (p. 15) “one or more 
negative self-directed emotions or attitudes that arise in response to one’s perceived involvement 
in a situation that one perceives to be morally undesirable” reduces the experience of moral 
distress to feeling bad because one is caught in a morally undesirable situation.   
 
Moral distress is a feeling that has moral meaning.  The sense that one has a responsibility to act 
is based on professional obligations.  It is a feeling in response to a failed action in an ethically 
challenging situation.  It is much more than feeling badly or simply being involved in a morally 
undesirable situation.  The authors’ recommendation that when “the distress springs from 
obviously misguided moral views or unreasonable beliefs about one’s involvement” (p. 22) it 
might be best to let individuals address the feelings on their own is misguided.  This attitude 
implies disdain for an individual who may be developing their ethical sensitivity in practice.  
How is one to gain insight without seeking assistance in exploring the nature of one’s feelings?  
 
It is unfortunate that the authors suggest moral distress can be whatever the author means it to be 
(Campbell, Ulrich and Grady, 2016 P.3).  For the person experiencing it, moral distress is real 
however to say one has moral distress is not enough.  Denise Dudzinski’s recent article (2016) 
provides an excellent map for dissecting an emotional experience thought to be moral distress.  
Had the authors focused their attention on the special features of moral distress explicated by 
Dudzinski instead of three elements, it might have become clear that their six cases do not offer 
any clarity for their definition or support their argument that a broader definition of moral 
distress is desirable.   
 
The authors’ use of cases does not serve their purpose well.  While some of the examples 
describe situations that have an impact on the moral experience of individuals, others fit into the 
current definition of moral distress and thus do not require a new definition.  Space does not 
allow for a point by point discussion of the authors’ six cases so I will address what I feel are the 
most problematic.  In their example of why moral uncertainty should be included in a definition 
of moral distress the authors’ use the example of a surgeon questioning the practice of assigning 
him as the junior surgeon to patients with complex medical conditions. The surgeon is 
experiencing some self-doubt and concern that he is harming patients.  One has to ask, is this a 
matter of conscience or confidence?  He considers two options that are arguably political not 
moral choices.  He is anticipating reasons why not to pursue an action.  Inaction would be a 
problem.   
 
Even if the surgeon does not know exactly what is the correct course of action, he recognizes a 
sense of responsibility, feels powerless, is concerned for patient well-being, believes there is 
personal risk regardless of the path chosen and to do nothing simply to protect himself would 
compromise his integrity.  Failing to pursue the counsel of someone who could offer a different 
perspective on his feelings (inaction) would be the problem in this scenario. His experience of 
moral distress is complicated by his uncertainty about what to do.   His struggle represents an 
internal constraint and could easily fall into the current understanding of moral distress.  No new 
definition is needed for this case.   
 
The second example is particularly troubling.  To state that the nurse in this scenario is only 
mildly distressed is no doubt plausible however the action (or inaction in this case) is motivated 
by self-interest and contrary to provisions in the Code of Ethics for Nurses (ANA, 2015).  The 
authors imply that because examples in the literature of moral distress are often dramatic that this 
somehow indicates all moral distress is intense and extreme and go so far to suggest that mild 
moral distress has a lower moral priority than stronger forms of distress.  Nowhere in the 
literature does any author suggest that mild moral distress has lower moral priority or that it 
should not be considered important. 
 
There are two instruments designed to measure moral distress currently in use and both ask 
respondents to indicate their degree (intensity) of distress (MDS-R Hamric, Borchers & Epstein, 
2012: and MDT Wocial & Weaver, 2013).  By using an example of “mild distress” to suggest 
that it somehow justifies a different definition of moral distress illustrates the authors’ 
unsophisticated understanding of the published literature on moral distress.  Not every episode of 
moral distress is dramatic, nor does any current definition suggest this.  The focus on high levels 
of distress is because there are numerous examples in the literature that provide evidence that 
high levels have significant negative consequences (Allen et al, 2013:  Houston, et al, 2013;  
Lamiani, Berghi & Argentero, 2015;  McAndrew, Leske, & Garcia, 2011; Whitehead, et al 2015; 
Wilson, et al, 2103). 
 
The case example used to convince the reader that a moral dilemma should somehow be 
included in a new definition of moral distress is a mistake.  What the parents ask of the clinicians 
is contrary to best practice in pediatrics.  The authors’ do not discuss assent which is a crucial 
concept to consider in the situation they describe.  The revelation that the bioethicist would 
advise the team to disclose to the patient the extent of his diagnosis suggests that the bioethicist 
is unfamiliar with pediatrics.   In this case the bioethicist should be troubled, not because of a 
moral dilemma but because he failed to do due diligence to identify an alternate path, for 
example engaging the patient in a discussion about how much he wants to know about his 
disease and informing the parents that children often ask and clinicians should never be put in a 
position to lie to the patient.  Using this case undermines the authors’ effort to convince the 
reader that moral dilemmas should be included in their umbrella term for moral distress.  Many 
who do ethics consultation recognize that the presence of moral distress is an indication of a 
moral dilemma. 
 
The introduction of the term bad moral luck is concerning.  The psychiatrist is obsessing about a 
patient’s actions which were completely beyond his control.  Would he obsess equally if he 
failed to provide the medication and the patient shot himself?  Bad outcomes for patients are not 
moral failings of providers.  Bad moral luck implies there is moral taint when a provider cares 
for a patient and the outcome for the patient is undesirable.  If this were the case, the emotional 
burden on providers would be paralyzing.  Unfortunate patient outcomes do not mean a morally 
bad choice was made. 
 
The delayed distress example is intriguing.  In the moment, the physician acts according to the 
standard of care.  On reflection, he has some uncertainty about whether or not he did the correct 
thing, based on concerns about the patient’s future quality of life if she survives.   There was no 
constraint on his actions at the time of the resuscitation.  His reflections may, likely will guide 
his future clinical practice and as a physician he will likely be able to exercise his clinical 
judgment and alter his clinical approach (stop resuscitation attempts sooner).  As described, 
rather than delayed distress, I might argue that the event led to increased moral sensitivity and 
reflection on practice.  Why try to lump this experience into a definition of moral distress?  Why 
not create a different taxonomy with moral distress a part of the moral experience and moral 
reflection another part?   
 
Finally, suggesting that there is something called anticipatory distress and that it should be 
included in a definition of moral distress is absurd.  What use is this idea?  Of course each of us 
should expect to find ourselves in morally compromising situations because they happen every 
day.  We should anticipate moral stress and use that to prepare ourselves for how we will act in 
the moment.  That is why we learn codes of ethics, practice guidelines, policies and procedures.   
 
Summary 
The authors use case examples that illustrate different types of moral work in an effort to argue 
that they describe things that should be included in a definition of moral distress.  Hard moral 
work is not the same as moral distress.  Perhaps the authors should propose a broader term (e.g. a 
troubled conscience) that includes moral distress in the taxonomy.  The great contribution of the 
authors’ essay is that it drives home the point that naming something moral distress does not 
make it so.  When one feels one has moral distress, the best course of action is to discuss the 
feelings with someone who can help that individual conduct an analysis of the experience to 
uncover the ethical nature of the problem.  The proposed broader definition of moral distress is 
not workable or desirable.  The essay by Campbell, Ulrich and Grady provides an opportunity to 
explore what moral distress is and is not and since the construct has gained such importance, 
their essay likely will contribute to further efforts to define the construct. 
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